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Nothing by mere authority: Evidence that in an experimental analogue of the Milgram paradigm participants are motivated not by orders but by appeals to science 
The title of this paper is a translation, from Latin, of the motto of the Royal Society: nullius in verba (Shand, 1993, p.117). Alternatively translated as “take no-one’s word for it”, the dictum means that scientific truth should not be guaged by the status of the author — be they lord, bishop or eminent professor — but only by the evidence that they present. Laudable as this is, it is at odds with social psychological research into what people (including scientists) actually do. This is generally understood to show that people inevitably succumb to those in authority.
The influence of this conformity model can be traced to the pioneering empirical work of Stanley Milgram (1963, 1965, 1974; see Moscovici, 1976; Turner, 1991, for discussion). As we have seen (Reicher, Haslam & Miller, this volume), despite the fact that in different variants of the Yale studies levels of conformity varied widely, what is generally remembered and reported in textbooks is the high level of compliance in the so-called 'baseline' condition. What is more, in line with Milgram's own 'agentic state' explanation of the findings, the studies are widely understood to show that people are naturally inclined to obey the orders of their superiors. Indeed, this instinct to obey is held responsible for the ease with which destructiveness and oppression become endemic within social systems (Milgram, 1974; see also Miller, 2004; Reicher & Haslam, 2011). 
As we have also seen, however, this conformity model has been challenged on a number of grounds (Reicher et al., this volume, see also Haslam & Reicher, 2012; Reicher, Haslam & Smith, 2012, for discussions). One of these — which is the focus of the present paper — relates to close analysis of the effect of the experimenter’s prods on the behavior of Milgram’s participants. There were four of these prods and they were delivered in a predetermined sequence starting with “Please continue” or “Please go on” (Prod 1; Milgram, 1974, p.38). If this failed to have the desired effect, the participant was told “The experiment requires that you continue” (Prod 2), and after this “It is absolutely essential that you continue” (Prod 3). Then, if all else failed, the experimenter insisted “You have no other choice, you must go on” (Prod 4). 
 As Burger (2009a) has observed, only the fourth of these prods clearly constitutes an order. Yet he also notes that in his own replications of the Milgram paradigm this prod proved to be the least successful of all in encouraging participants to continue. More specifically, while 64% of participants continued after receiving Prod 1, and 46% and 10% after receiving Prods 2 and 3, not a single participant continued after receiving Prod 4 (Burger, 2009a; Burger, Girgis, & Manning, 2011). This also accords with data in the Yale archive which yields no evidence of participants responding positively to this prod. For example, one participant retorts “Yes I do have a choice — I’m not going to go ahead with it,” another “Sure I have a choice… just cut it out, after all he [the Learner] knows what he can stand and that’s where I’m going to stand on it”, and yet another “If this were Russia maybe, but not in America” (Milgram, 1974, p.65; Radiolab, 2011). Thus, rather than showing that people obey the orders of those in authority, the Milgram paradigm in fact seems to provide evidence of the very opposite — that orders induce disobedience (Haslam, Reicher & Platow, 2011). 
As part of a broader reinterpretation of Milgram’s findings and in line with previous research in the social identity tradition (after Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987), we have argued that ordering participants to continue is counterproductive because it positions the experimenter as an outsider who is acting against the participant. Indeed, more generally, we have argued that the willingness of participants to administer shocks does not reflect ‘blind obedience’, but rather a form of engaged followership that is predicated upon participants’ acceptance of the experimenter’s scientific goals and the leadership that he exhibits in pursuing them (Haslam & Reicher, 2012; Reicher et al., 2012). To the extent that aspects of the paradigm (e.g., its location, the appearance and behavior of the experimenter, the technical apparatus) encourage identification with this scientific enterprise (and many aspects of the baseline study do; Russell, 2011) then participants prove willing to play their part in helping to realize those goals. However, if aspects of the paradigm undermine this identification or serve to encourage an alternative identification with the Learner and the general community (in the way that many variants do; Reicher et al., 2012), then participants will be far less obliging.
This alternative interpretation is supported by several recent studies. First, meta-analysis by Packer (2008) has shown the point at which participants tend to break away from the experimenter is the point at which the Learner’s protests become vocal. Second, our own work has demonstrated that the degree to which a given variant of the paradigm is perceived to encourage identification with the Experimenter and the scientific community that he represents (vs. the Learner and the general community that he represents) is an extremely good predictor of the proportion of participants that continue all the way to 450v (Reicher et al., 2012). 
As argued above, evidence of participants’ responses to the experimenter’s prods also accords with the idea that it is not conformity or obedience that drives the effects Milgram reported. Indeed, in many ways the claim that people systematically disobey orders in Milgram's studies is the most profound and provocative challenge to the conformity model. However, there is an obvious confound between the content of the prods and the order in which they are presented which makes such an argument provisional at best. For it is unclear whether participants’ resistance to Prod 4 was a consequence of it being an order, or a consequence of it coming after three other prods that they had already resisted. Perhaps Prod 4 was ineffective because participants were tired of being prodded or because they were already committed to resisting. 
Equally, the confound between content and order does not allow us to test our alternative claim that it is identification with the experimenter’s scientific goals that motivates participants’ followership. The prod that relates most clearly to this theoretical account is Prod 2, as this indicates that continuation is essential for the success of the science. Yet the relative success of this prod in inducing compliance could be attributed to the fact that it is delivered relatively early in the sequence. Perhaps Prod 2 was effective because participants were not yet tired of being prodded or not yet committed to resisting.
The present study
The goal of the present experiment is to try to resolve these questions about the role that prods play in determining whether or not participants continue towards the goals set out by the Experimenter. The principal way in which it does this is by manipulating the prods between-participants (rather than in a pre-determined sequence) in order to examine the independent effect that each has upon participants’ willingness to follow experimental instructions and to persevere with an increasingly challenging experimental task.
Of course, in setting about examining the issues raised by Milgram’s work, an initial question concerns the most effective way to address the various challenges that the study itself presents. Ethically, straightforward replication of the paradigm is impossible (after Baumrind, 1964). Logistically, the paradigm is also extremely expensive and time-consuming to reproduce (Burger, 2009b). In an attempt to circumvent these difficulties, we therefore devised an analogue of the paradigm that incorporated some of its most relevant features, but which was relatively easy to implement and which would not create unacceptable levels of stress for participants. 
The study was conducted on-line and was introduced as an investigation of “the process by which people make word-image associations.… a topic of considerable interest to cognitive neuroscientists interested in neural networking within the brain”. Participants were told that they would be presented with a series of pictures of different groups and that their task was to select one word from a list of five to describe each one. Thirty pictures were then presented in a predetermined sequence: starting with a group that independent judges found very unpleasant (the Ku Klux Klan) but becoming progressively more pleasant, so that the 30th group was one that was very pleasant (a family walking in a park). In each case the five words that could be used to describe the groups were all negative, so that whereas at the outset the task was quite easy and unproblematic, by then end it was much more aversive (in line with previous evidence in the stereotyping literature; after Katz & Braly, 1933; e.g., see Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994). 
After describing each group, participants were given a prod to continue. Importantly, this was varied across four independent conditions, so that in each condition participants received just one of Milgram’s four original prods. As in the Milgram paradigm, the key dependent variables in which we were interested were whether participants would continue to the end of the study and, if not, how far they would go. More particularly, we were interested in whether these outcomes would depend on the prods that were given after each response. Whereas the conformity model predicts that participants would go further the more the prod resembled an order, our engaged followership model predicts that they would go further the more that the prod appealed to the study’s scientific objectives. 
Method
Pre-testing A: Identification of stimulus images
In order to construct the set of stimulus images for presentation in the study we initially identified a series of 60 photographs representing groups that were assumed to vary considerably in the degree to which people would find them pleasant or unpleasant. As part of an online survey, these were then presented to a group of 151 respondents (52 men, 99 women; Mean age = 32.6 (SD = 11.9) who were asked to respond to two questions: (a) “How pleasant is this group of people?” and (b) “How offensive is this group of people?” Responses were made on 7-point scales (where 1 = not at all, 7 = very), and, after reverse-scoring of the second item, these were averaged to provide a single measure of perceived pleasantness. 
On the basis of this procedure, a subset of 30 pictures was then selected so as to include groups that covered the full range of possible scores (from very unpleasant to very pleasant) and between which there were approximately equal intervals. The results are presented in Figure 1. Within the resultant set of images the linear relationship between order and pleasantness was extremely high (r=.99, Flin=972.23, p<.001). 
Pre-testing B: Classification of Milgram’s prods
Although Burger’s (2009) argument that Prod 4 is the prod that most resembles an order is extremely plausible, we wanted to establish independently that this was the case and to obtain some index of the degree to which other prods also constituted an order. At the same time, we wanted some index of the degree to which the various prods could be implicitly understood as an appeal to the requirements of science, a request, or a justification. 
For this purpose the four prods were presented in random order to a group of 25 independent respondents (10 men, 15 women; Mean age = 32.4 (SD=9.62)) who were asked to indicate, using 7-point scales (where 1 = not at all, 7 = very much), the extent to which each represented either (a) an implicit order, (b) an implicit reference to the experiment’s scientific requirements, (c) an implicit request, or (d) an implicit justification for continuing. They were also asked to indicate which one of these descriptions best characterized each prod.
The results of this exercise are presented in Table 1. From this it can be seen that, as predicted, most respondents considered Prod 1 to be a request, Prod 2 to be a reference to scientific requirements, and Prod 4 to be an order. Prod 3 was harder to classify but was considered equally both a reference to scientific requirements (though less than Prod 2) and an order (though less than Prod 4). 
Ethical approval
Ethical approval was granted by the Psychology Ethics Committee at the University of Exeter. A condition of approval was that participants should not be members of an ethnic minority group. To ensure that this condition was met, demographic information was collected at the start of the study and participants who did not self-identity as White-British were redirected to another study. 
Participants and design
Participants were recruited by means of an e-mail sent to individuals who had previously indicated a willingness to participate voluntarily in psychological research at the University of Exeter. They were offered no incentive for participation. The advert introduced the research by stating:
Recent research in cognitive neuroscience has found a link between the associations we make and the way we perceive one another. Based on this, researchers in this field are keen to test whether the same processes in the brain that are used when forming word–image associations are also used when forming interpersonal perceptions. 
This study is part of a larger project aiming to pin-point neurons in the brain that are used to form impressions. Such work is important as it could help explain cognitive differences between us regarding the way that we form impressions of each other. 
The e-mail provided recipients with a link to an on-line experiment, and they were randomly assigned to receive one of four links corresponding to the four experimental conditions. The process of recruitment continued iteratively until there were 25 participants in each condition. The resultant sample of 100 participants contained 19 men and 79 women (2 unspecified) whose mean age was 29.7 (SD=10.1; based on data from 92 participants who indicated their age) and who defined themselves as White-British. 
Procedure
Upon linking to the study, the opening page asked participants to provide demographic information including their age, gender, and ethnic group membership (using categories employed in the UK census). Having completed this, only participants who self-defined as White-British were linked through to the main experiment. The rubric for this stated that: 
In this research we are interested in examining the process by which people make word–image associations. This is a topic of considerable interest to cognitive neuroscientists interested in neural networking within the brain. 
Your task is look at photographs of a group of people and to select a negative word to describe each one. Your responses will help psychological scientists understand the process of word-image association. In each case you should do this by selecting one word from the five listed below each picture.
Following this, participants were presented with the first image in the series that had been developed on the basis of the pre-testing described above (an image of Klu Klux Klan members; see Figure 1). Below this was a list of five negative words from which participants had to select one. There were five such lists, each containing adjectives from Katz and Braly’s (1933) stereotype checklist (or close synonyms). These were as follows:
List A: 	deceitful	stupid	lazy	cruel	arrogant
List B: 	treacherous	dim-witted	dirty	barbaric	smug
List C: 	sly	moronic 	grubby	brutal	insolent
List D: 	dishonest 	ignorant 	idle 	vicious	egotistical
List E: 	untrustworthy	rude	slovenly	aggressive	conceited 
The list of words underneath each image was rotated so that List A was presented with Pictures 1, 6, 11, 16, 21 and 26; List B with Pictures 2, 7, 12, 17, 22 and 27, and so on.
After they had selected a word to describe the group in the picture participants were given one of the following four prods, as previously used by Milgram (1974, p.38):
Prod 1: 	Please continue
Prod 2: 	The experiment requires that you continue
Prod 3: 	It is absolutely essential that you continue
Prod 4: 	You have no other choice, you must continue
Below this were two buttons, one which read “Click to Continue” the other which read “Click to Stop”. If participants clicked the Continue button, then a new page with the next image in the sequence came up, and the process was repeated until they had responded to the 30th picture or pressed the Stop button. 
Once participants had responded to the 30th picture or clicked the Stop button they were presented with a fresh page that contained a series of eight post-test measures to which they responded using 7-point scales (where 1 = do not agree at all, 7 = agree completely). Two of these assessed task comfort (I found it hard to continue to the end of this experiment [recoded]; I was comfortable continuing to the end of this experiment), two assessed identification with researchers (I identify with the researchers who designed this study; I feel positive about the scientists behind this research), two assessed identification with experimental goals (I think work on neural networking is important; I want to help scientists understand the nature of neural networking); and two assessed identification with psychological science (I identify with the goals of psychological science; I feel good about furthering psychological science).
After completing these measures, participants were provided with a debriefing that explained the real purpose of the research. This explained that the study was concerned with understanding how people respond to different types of instruction. Participants were also invited to contact the researchers if they had any questions or concerns about the study. In the event, none did.
Results
Willingness to continue
The study generated three different measures of participants’ willingness to continue in the study: (a) how far they went before they pressed the Stop button (1-30), (b) whether or not they got to Picture 30 (0=no, 1=yes), and (c) whether or not they completed the post-test measures (0=no, 1=yes). Scores on the first of these measures were analyzed by means of one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), but as they involved binary data, scores on the other two measures were examined using logistic regression. Means and test statistics for all three measures are presented in Table 2.
(a) Point of termination. Analysis of variance revealed a main effect for prod. Post-hoc tests (Fischer’s LSD; =.05) indicated that this effect arose from the fact that participants given Prod 2 (“the experiment requires that you continue”) went further than those given either Prod 1 (“please continue”, p=.041) or Prod 4 (“you have no other choice, you must go on”, p=.004). 
(b) Completing the study (going to Picture 30). Logistic regression testing the full model against the constant model was statistically significant, indicating that the prod participants were given reliably distinguished between those who continued to the end of the study and those who did not. The model predicted between 9% (Cox & Snell) and 12% (Nagelkerke) of the variance in the DV and accurately predicted 63% of all cases. Likelihood ratio analysis to identify between-condition differences (with adjusted for multiple comparisons) indicated that the full model was driven by the fact that participants given Prod 2 were more likely to complete the study than those given Prod 1.
(c) Completing post-test measures. Logistic regression testing the full model against the constant model was statistically significant, indicating that the prod participants were given reliably distinguished between those who completed the post-test measures and those who did not. The model explained between 8% (Cox & Snell) and 11% (Nagelkerke) of the variance in the DV and accurately predicted 68% of all cases. Likelihood ratio analysis (with ) indicated that the full model was driven by the fact that participants given Prod 2 were more likely to complete post-test measures than those given Prod 4.
Prod characteristics as predictors of willingness to continue
In order to examine the degree to which participants’ willingness to continue in the study was predicted by the nature of the prod they were given, simple bivariate correlations were computed between responses on the above three measures and the degree to which the prods in question were seen to constitute an order, a reference to the scientific requirements, a request, or a justification (as established in the forced choice component of Pre-testing B). These correlations are presented in Table 3. 
From this table it can be seen that the degree to which a prod was independently judged to make reference to the study’s scientific requirements was a significant positive predictor of all three measures of participants’ willingness to continue, as was the degree to which a prod was  seen as a justification (reflecting the fact that these two prod characteristics were perfectly correlated). In contrast, the extent to which the prod was classified as a request was a significant negative predictor of study completion; while the extent to which it was considered an order was a negative predictor of both the point of termination and post-test completion (although the first of these correlations was only marginally significant). 
Post-test measures
The interpretation of post-test data is clouded by the fact that only 68 participants completed all the post-test measures, and whether or not they did varied as a function of the prod to which they were exposed (as noted above). Nevertheless, analysis suggested that the two items assessing each construct could be aggregated to form reliable scales (task comfort: r=.68, p<.001; identification with researchers: r=.56, p<.001; identification with experimental goals: r=.53, p<.001; identification with psychological science: r=.78, p<.001). 
Scores on these scales were subjected to analysis of variance as a function of the prod that participants were given but this revealed no significant effects (all Fs<1.21). Nevertheless global analysis indicated that the mean level of task comfort was significantly below the scale midpoint (M=2.55, t =-6.84, p<.001) as was that for identification with the researchers (M=3.02, t =-6.27, p<.001). In contrast, the mean level of identification with researchers’ experimental goals was significantly above the scale midpoint (M=4.96, t =6.34, p<.001), as was the mean for identification with psychological science (M=5.41, t =9.56, p<.001). In short, participants generally reported having found it hard to get to the end of the study, and expressed low levels of identification with the researchers but high levels of identification with both the study’s scientific goals and with psychological science more generally.
Discussion
The goal of this study was to clarify the role that prods play in encouraging participants to persevere within the Milgram paradigm. In line with Milgram’s (1974) agentic state model, a conformity account suggests that participants continue because they comply with the wishes and orders of those in authority — an analysis echoed in the perpetrator’s defense “I was only following orders” (Mandel, 1998). However, as Burger (2009a) has noted, this model sits uncomfortably with evidence that within the paradigm participants respond least positively to the prod that looks most like an order (Prod 4: “You have no other choice, you must continue”). At the same time, though, the interpretation of the role that different prods play within the paradigm is clouded by confounds that are introduced because they are always delivered in a pre-determined sequence. 
In the present study these confounds were resolved by manipulating prods between participants. Importantly too, this also allowed us to test predictions of the conformity model competitively against those derived from our own engaged followership account. This account argues that participants’ willingness to continue within the paradigm is predicated on their active identification with the scientific project that the experimenter is leading (Haslam & Reicher, 2012; Reicher & Haslam, 2011). This led us to predict that participants would be most willing to continue when they were presented with Prod 2 (“The experiment requires that you continue”), as this is the prod that makes clearest reference to the study’s scientific underpinnings and objectives (a fact confirmed by pre-testing).
The results of the study provided support for this engaged followership model but none for the traditional conformity account. Most particularly, participants exposed to Prod 2 continued further in the study than those exposed to Prod 4, and they were also much more likely to complete the study’s post-test measures. Across all conditions, the extent to which a prod made reference to scientific requirements also positively predicted continuation and completion, whereas being seen as an order was, if anything, a negative predictor of these outcomes. In short, it appears that once the going got tough and participants were asked to assign negative descriptors to overtly positive groups (e.g., care providers and families) they were more inclined to disobey an order than to follow it.
Aside from this primary evidence, there are several other aspects of our results that are worthy of comment. The first is that, contrary to evidence from Burger’s (2009a) study, Prod 1 (“Please continue”) was also relatively ineffective as a means of encouraging participants to go further. Again, though, this is resonates with our claim that continuation is an active process such that participants need a reason to continue doing something that they find aversive. It also relates to the more general observation that, far from being a slippery slope down which perpetrators fall helplessly, performing objectionable (or evil) tasks is instead a mountain that has to be climbed with, and for, a purpose (Haslam & Reicher, 2007; Reicher, Haslam & Rath, 2009; Lozovick, 2002, p.279). Consistent with this point, evidence also suggests that willingness to continue in the study was predicted by the extent to which a given prod represented a justification. Importantly, though, no prod was seen only or primarily as a justification. Moreover, justification appeared potent precisely because it was couched in terms of identity-relevant activity — namely the scientific enterprise. In other words, Prod 2 proved effective (unlike Prods 1 and 4) because it provided a rationale for continuation that was consonant with the shared identity that underpinned both leadership (i.e., the experimenter’s influence) and followership (i.e., participants’ commitment and endeavor; Haslam et al., 2011). 
 In this regard, one further interesting feature of our post-test data is that the willingness of participants to complete the task was associated with high levels of identification both with psychological science and with what were believed to be the specific goals of the research in question. At the same time, participants reported relatively low levels of identification with the researchers running the study. This latter finding might be seen to contradict our argument that identification with the experimenter underpins the behavior of participants within the Milgram paradigm (e.g., Reicher et al., 2012). Critically, though, our point is that task completion is predicated upon social identification with experimenter as a representative of the scientific community and not by personal identification with him as an individual. Indeed, elsewhere we have noted that it is this social identification that is essential for the process of leadership influence (and followership; Haslam et al., 2011). This means that just as it is possible to like and identify with a person as an individual but not be motivated to follow them, so too one can dislike leaders as individuals but still be committed to following them by virtue of their representativeness of an ingroup category. The latter, then, is what we assume was going on in the present case, although this is certainly an interpretation that future research should investigate more forensically. 
One final point to discuss is the utility of the novel paradigm that we developed to explore these issues. An obvious point here is that while this incorporated several important features of the Milgram paradigm (e.g., the scientific cover story, the aversive nature of the task, its incremental structure), it clearly lacked much of the drama that makes Milgram’s work so compelling (Millward, 2011). In part this is because its dependent variable was far less attention-grabbing than the administration of lethal shocks; but in part too this is because it lacked an alternative voice (paralleling that of the Learner) urging participants to pursue a different course of action. We argued that these differences were essential on ethical and logistical grounds, but nevertheless we believe that, within the constraints that these considerations impose, the paradigm has been shown to have considerable utility as a conceptual analogue that can be used — at least in the first instance — as a means of advancing theoretical understanding of Milgram’s own findings. 
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Table 1. Pre-testing B: Classification of Milgram’s prods 

		Rating*	Forced choice†
Prod* 		Request	Ref. to Science	Order	Justif-ication	Request	Ref. to Science	Order	Justif-ication
1	Please continue	5.60	2.52	2.48	2.44	88	4	4	4
2	The experiment requires that you continue	4.16	5.48	4.08	4.76	24	44	16	16
3	It is absolutely essential that you continue	3.44	4.52	4.64	3.56	20	32	36	12




* Agreement with a given definition of prod on 7-point rating scale (where 1 = do not agree at all; 7 = agree completely) 
† Forced choice = Percentage of participants choosing to categorize prod in a given way when forced to choose between four options




Table 2. Willingness to continue in the experiment as a function of condition

	Condition		
	Prod 1	Prod 2	Prod 3	Prod 4	Test statistic	p
Point of termination (max=30)	21.7a	26.9ab	23.0	19.5b	F=3.11	.03
Likelihood of completing study (going to Pic 30)	.24a	.64a	.56	.44	2=9.54	.02
Likelihood of completing post-test	.68	.88a	.64	.52a	2=8.40	.04

Note
Cells with the same superscript are significantly different (Tukey’s LSD, p < .05)




Table 3. Correlations between prod characteristics and willingness to continue in the experiment 

	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.
1. Prod is Order	-.31**	-.68**	-.32**	-.18†	.05	-.20*
2. Prod is Reference to Scientific Requirements		-.48**	1.00**	.27**	.27**	.21*
3. Prod is Request			-.48*	-.04	-.25*	.03
4. Prod is Justification				.27**	.27**	.21*
5. Point of termination					.70**	.36**
































Figure 1. Pre-testing A: Mean ratings of stimulus groups’ pleasantness 
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